Saturday, September 13, 2008

The EU Concedes to Russia

I take no pride in being right about Russia, at least not today. European Union French President M. Nicholas Sarkozy said in a statement to Moscow on Friday that Russia must withdraw its troops from Georgia proper and Georgia must withdraw its troops to military bases no later than October 1, 2008. Russian peacekeeping (his words, emphasis added) troops would be replaced by 200 UNOMIG (United Nations Observer Missions in Georgia) and OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) international observers. The UNOMIG and OSCE observers will investigate in Georgia proper only and Russian troops will be allowed to remain in South Ossetia and Abkhazia as per the September 12, 2008 agreement reached between Sarkozy and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev.

It was a deferential move for the economic superpower to cede these sizeable regions of the Georgian State to Russia. It is frankly, reminiscent of Neville Chamberlain's concession of Czechoslovakia to Germany in 1938. Except that, to Paraphrase Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, if Russia had meant to capture Tbilisi, their forces could have done so in as little as four hours (given how they steamrolled over them in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, I doubt he was exaggerating).

Clearly, taking over Georgia proper was not one of their aims. Had this been the case, it is unlikely that the Russian strategy would have focused so heavily on expelling Georgian troops from the breakaway regions with such intensity - if at all. Given their air superiority over Georgia, they could have easily razed Tbilisi to the ground in a matter of hours and had Georgian President Mikheil Sakaashvili in custody in a matter of days.

Why did the EU not define Georgian territorial integrity to include the breakaway regions? If my more conservative readers can stomach it, I would like to indulge in some educated speculation. Surely, the EU watched the United States, as did Russia, when their friend and ally, Mikheil Sakaashvili, called for their military assistance and received only weak reprimands aimed at Russia from President Bush and Senator McCain, and most recently, either an inadvertent or a veiled threat from Alaska Governor Sarah Palin. Sakaashvili, clearly unimpressed with Senator McCain's empty threats, called him out. Though aid has been sent to Georgia, American sabres - though rattled - remain firmly in their scabbards.

There was a very good reason that the French and the English engaged in a policy of appeasement with Germany in the 1930s: they didn't want a Second World War. The first had been horrible. The machine age had unleased horrible weaponry, munitions that disfigured soldiers so profoundly that it found its expression in a new genre of feature-length films in the twenties: horror. But if the thought of another mechanized war with Germany was horrifying to England and France, staring down the business end of the Russian nuclear arsenal must have them in a solid state of panic.

If the EU has any grasp of the history of the past two decades, a few facts are doubtlessly, not lost on them. First, the United States military doesn't move at lightning speed. That's not a bad thing. Operation Desert Shield prepared our troops well for Operation Desert Storm - it only took them four months. But Russia was able to mobilize within hours, and defeat American and Israeli-trained (and armed) Georgian troops within five days. Further, in his candidacy for President, John McCain (who is ahead according to Gallup Polls, as of Sunday) has resisted talk of withdrawing from Iraq. George Bush's drawdown is still 8,000 troops heavier than pre-surge levels. And even Barack Obama's strategy for withdrawal ties up our forces in Iraq until 2010. There simply is no plan on the table that allows the United States the ability to spare the military personnel necessary to honor NATO in the event of a Russian invasion, no matter what.

That leaves the threat of American interceptor missiles, one that has Putin aiming nukes at Europe (again) and negotiating for Western real estate with Castro (again) and Chavez to park ICBMs closer to the US (again). It is also a threat that makes it in Russia's best interests to take advantage of Europe while the United States is busy elsewhere.

So who in NATO will stand up to Russia, should they decide to play rough? The British are still strong, but they can't take on Russia alone. Their greatest advantage - naval power - would do little against a nation that is (and whose neighbors are) mostly landlocked. US troops in Europe have been cut by half (to around 25,000) since 2006. The French haven't had a strong military since Napoleon, and Sarkozy's concessions to Russia speak volumes about the EU's attitudes toward Russia. Finally, Georgia already had been promised membership with the EU at the time of the conflict; clearly Sakaashvili was counting on that when he rolled the dice on forcing South Ossetia and Abkazia back into the fold. But no one came to his rescue.

Whether this was because the EU recognized they were being used in his game with Russia or simply realized that Georgia simply wasn't worth the risks inherent in going to war with a re-vitalized Russia, no one in NATO - outside the United States - even breathed the word war. And if it were simply a matter of the United States being busy elsewhere, it would have been enough for the EU to flinch. But there is a lot more going on in the United States than two foreign occupations.

The U.S. banking system, which has been built up primarily through an assembly-line mortgage system, drove housing values to inflate as much as 300%. The bubble, of course, burst. Indy Mac in California suffered a 1929-style run-on-a-bank: the Fed took over. Bear Sterns Cos. collapsed: the Fed loaned JPMorgan and Chase the money to buy them out at a bargain basement interest rate. Then Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae had to be bailed out. Friday, Lehman wanted the same deal Bear Sterns got; the Fed told them they were on their own.

Which tells us the well is running dry. What we know of modern warfare is that it requires a strong economy. The Big War turned the United States - temporarily - into a socialist country. We mobilized for war: women went to work in munitions factories and young men joined, or were drafted, into the military. Rationing was imposed. By the end of it, soldiers came home, dreading the poverty of the Great Depression, and were shocked to find a revitalized economy.

Times have changed. War doesn't create new jobs anymore; corporations, beholden to their investors to maximize profits, either outsource or build outside of the United States. The Keynesian economic policies that hauled us out of the Great Depression required government investment into the economy, and while the movement to "privatize" as much of the government as possible is certainly attractive to the free market purists, the long term evidence isn't promising.

Certainly the EU is aware of the US's economic woes. The bailout of Freddie and Fannie is little more than band-aid on a compound fracture. At least one economist (Michael Hudson) has indicated that the bailout exists solely to prevent the two mortgage giants from collapsing - and taking the economy with it - prior to the elections in November. Further, Michael Hudson alleges that these bailouts will protect Bush supporters from something that anyone responsible for a fraction of this destruction would inevitably face: prison. So if Angela Merkel (who, incidentally, is opposed to Ukraine and Georgia obtaining NATO membership) and Nicholas Sarkozy are at all forward thinking and aware in the present, the US isn't looking so healthy. And given the EU's dependency on Russia for oil and natural gas, the old NATO alliance may not seem so important to them lately.

2 comments:

JohnR22926 said...

IMO the possibility of the West going to war over South Ossetia (or even Georgia, if it came to that) was zero. And everyone involved knew it. Not because of military capability or cost, but because the West has no stomach for WW III, the countries involved are armed to the teeth with nukes, and there's a weak moral argument to be made that Russia is entitled to some degree of control over her (formerly soviet) border nations.

So, for Russia, the question was what did they have to gain, and what to lose.

For the Russians, Georgia itself is of little value. I can only see this conflict as the opening move in a larger game. To reign in the border nations (i.e. Ukraine, Belarus, etc.). Perhaps as a first step in reconstituting the Russian Federation.

And what to lose? Well, international cooperation I guess. Membership in the G8, eventual membership in the EU, trade agreements, etc.

Russia is an intensly proud and nationalistic nation with a long history of empire. They're in decent financial shape for now with vast natural resources including oil. My guess is that Putin knows full well that the West will not go to war over ANY of Russia's border nations so he'll push hard to expand Russia's sphere of influence and will take whatever sanctions the West imposes.

IMO the flash point will come if/when NATO admits Ukraine. You see, once a nation is in either the EU and/or NATO, the whole issue changes. The West is virtually obliged to fight if an EU/Nato nation is invaded.

AnarchyJack said...

Historically, Russia has never had a strong economy, though coming out of the cold - and having oil and natural gas as such a hot commodity - appears to have strengthened them a great deal. However, Russia's stock market reacted fiercely yesterday to the 450 point drop in our markets. I'm sure that today's rally had a proportionately positive effect on their markets as well. The thing to remember about war between balanced powers is that it is only fought after every other alternative has been exhausted.

Everyone has been blasting away at Chamberlain with both barrels lately, but I don't think most of us can appreciate the scope of the Great War in comparison to everything that had come before. The results of mechanized war were unlike anything that anyone had seen before, and the French and English policy of appeasement was in part to avoid further horror, but also an attitude among the British that the Germans had been unnecessarily humiliated by the French at the Treaty of Versailles.

But there is another factor that made Germany able to emerge from the ashes of WWI, one that I would have to research in some depth before coming to a conclusion on, but one that I strongly doubt Russia will be able to match.

Hjalmar Schacht was perhaps one of the greatest practicianers of economists that ever lived. Like Russia, Germany's economy suffered when the U.S. stock market plummeted. But in 1933, Hitler appointed Schacht as the Reich Economics Minister. Goal-oriented societies are, by their nature, socialist. By marshalling skilled German workers under the industrialists and drawing the unskilled and professional population to the SS, Hitler and Schacht were able to rebuild an economy that had been in tatters the first half of the 1930s.

But while Russia is not lacking in political will, skilled workers, soldiers and professionals, it is lacking in industrial capitalists and economic wizardry. The differences between the Third Reich and post-Soviet Russia, are of course much greater. Germany never had its hands on the nuclear football (thanks to anti-semitism) and had allowed itself for the third time in its history to fight on two fronts. The vast expanse of Siberia makes it a natural barrier against eastern attack; I would need to check, but I don't recall reading about the Japanese staging any kind of attack against Russia from the Pacific - though the Siberian forces were prepared for just such a scenario.

I think that the recent economic fallout will have a profound effect on Russia's next move, though I don't know what that will be yet. But here are some things to watch for: 1) Russia's economy begins improving, while ours remains stagnant; 2) unemployment drops dramatically in Russia as a result of some entity "creating new jobs," unrelated to Western corporate outsourcing; 3) we see a spike in research and development spending in the Eastern Block, and 4) there are reports of troop build-up on the border regions.

Any one of these things likely means little or nothing on its own. Seeing all four happen simultaneously would be cause for alarm. But I have my doubts that Russia is interested, much less, capable, of marshalling the kind of economic strength that a return to a belligerant world power would require.

That said, that would not preclude them from once again taking control of Ukraine and Georgia. The Crimean Peninsula, home to the Black Sea fleet, is the major flashpoint at this time. No matter what the risks, I simply can't see Russia allowing NATO to get its hooks in the Black Sea. So any talk of EU and NATO membership for the former Soviet States that surround the Black Sea is going to be perceived by Russia as an aggressive move by the West.

I will be addressing the finer points on this subject in future threads